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Anonymization plays a key role in enabling the pub-
lic release of network datasets, and yet there are few,
if any, techniques for evaluating the efficacy of network
data anonymization techniques with respect to the pri-
vacy they afford. In fact, recent work suggests that
many state-of-the-art anonymization techniques may
leak more information than first thought. In this pa-
per, we propose techniques for evaluating the anonymity
of network data. Specifically, we simulate the behavior
of an adversary whose goal is to deanonymize objects,
such as hosts or web pages, within the network data.
By doing so, we are able to quantify the anonymity of
the data using information theoretic metrics, objectively
compare the efficacy of anonymization techniques, and
examine the impact of selective deanonymization on the
anonymity of the data. Moreover, we provide several
concrete applications of our approach on real network
data in the hope of underscoring its usefulness to data
publishers.
1 Introduction
The availability of realistic network data plays a key
role in fostering new solutions to the latest network and
security research problems. Unfortunately, due to the
sensitive nature of the information that may be con-
tained within such data, organizations are often reluc-
tant to make network data available. Therefore, signifi-
cant emphasis has been placed on developing techniques
for network data anonymization, i.e., the process of san-
itizing data before release so that sensitive information
cannot be extracted [20, 28, 29, 30]. Emboldened by
the availability of these tools, the community has devel-
oped several data repositories to encourage more sharing
among researchers and practitioners [22, 26, 10]. How-
ever, when it comes to the efficacy of these anonymiza-
tion tools, the devil is in the details [20].
1This paper has been modified from its published version to correct
notational errors in Section 6.
Indeed, the anonymization systems relied upon today
provide few, if any, guarantees on privacy. Moreover,
they do not allow the publisher to quantify the risks
involved with publishing a particular dataset. For the
most part, progress in the development of anonymiza-
tion systems has occurred primarily in reaction to the
evolving threats to privacy or the need for greater util-
ity (e.g., [19, 14]). Given the reactionary nature of net-
work trace sanitization, it comes as no surprise that sev-
eral recent works have shown that, in certain cases, it
is possible to infer network topology [8], deanonymize
public hosts [8, 15, 2, 3, 23], and identify web brows-
ing behaviors [7, 15] despite the use of state-of-the-art
anonymization. The existence of such attacks and the
fact that there are, at present, no rigorous methods for
evaluating the anonymization of network data may lead
to a loss of confidence in anonymization techniques and
a decrease in available network data.
Intuitively, it would seem that the problems faced in
anonymizing network data can be overcome by apply-
ing advances in other domains. For instance, the prob-
lem of evaluating anonymity in network data would ap-
pear to be closely related to that of inference control in
databases (e.g., [24, 13, 4, 12]); each packet or flow
in the network data might be considered as a row in
a database, lending itself to the direct application of a
vast body of work on privacy preserving techniques for
databases. Unfortunately, the peculiar nature of network
data makes the direct application of these techniques
problematic. Most notably, when dealing with network
data, it is difficult to know a priori which fields should
be considered sensitive. Finding such channels of in-
formation leakage lies at the heart of the network data
sanitization problem. Furthermore, some of the most
sensitive information in the network data, such as web
browsing activities, are encoded in the distributions of
values over several packets or flows. These differences
warrant the development of new techniques tailored to
evaluating network data.
In this paper, we frame the analysis of anonymized
network data as the simulation of an adversary whose
goal is to distinguish the true identity of an anonymized
object, such as a host, from among all possible
unanonymized identities. Generally speaking, attacks
on network data anonymization proceed as follows.
The adversary approximates the expected feature dis-
tributions (e.g., distribution of local port numbers)
for unanonymized objects by using public information
sources, such as DNS records or web search engines.
She then calculates the feature distributions for each of
the anonymized objects, and compares them to the ap-
proximated distributions for the unanonymized objects.
If a one-to-one mapping exists between the anonymized
and unanonymized distributions, then she can infer the
identity of the object. This general algorithm for the
adversary’s behavior describes a broad and meaning-
ful class of inference attacks, including several attacks
against anonymized network data [8, 15, 2, 3, 7, 23].
Our approach simulates such an adversary by com-
paring objects from the unanonymized and anonymized
data directly, thereby assuming that she has perfect
knowledge of the unanonymized distributions. To an-
alyze the anonymity of an object, we calculate the fea-
ture distributions for that anonymized object, and com-
pare them to the feature distributions of all objects in the
unanonymized data that are of the same type (e.g., host
objects). From this comparison, we derive a probabil-
ity distribution over the object’s possible unanonymized
identities. To quantify the anonymity of the object, we
calculate the information entropy of this derived prob-
ability distribution. Furthermore, we model the auxil-
iary information gained by the adversary from meta-data
provided by the data publisher, and from deanonymiza-
tion of objects within the data.
The main contributions of this paper are in show-
ing that, through the use of entropy metrics, publishers
can identify objects that are at risk of deanonymization,
and can objectively compare the performance of vari-
ous anonymization systems and policies. Moreover, by
simulating the adversary’s auxiliary information, a pub-
lisher can examine the impact of deanonymization on
the anonymity of other objects. To underscore the utility
of our approach, we provide several concrete applica-
tions of this analysis to real network data.
2 Preliminaries
The analysis techniques presented in this paper make
heavy use of concepts from probability and information
theory. For ease of exposition, we first review the con-
cepts and definitions used throughout the remainder of
this paper.
Probability Distributions and Random Variables
Our analysis is founded on the examination of joint
and marginal probability distributions computed from
the set of values found in the various fields of the net-
work data. In general, we can consider a random vari-
able X that describes the probability distribution over
values from a single field in the network data. A joint
distribution on fields represented by random variables X
and Y describes the probability distribution of the val-
ues from X and Y that occur together, and the probabil-
ity mass function for the joint distribution is denoted as
p(x, y), where x and y are values taken from the sample
spaces of X and Y , respectively. A joint distribution can
be created from an arbitrary number of random variables
by generalizing the definition accordingly. Similarly, a
marginal distribution on a field represented by the ran-
dom variable X would describe the probability distri-
bution of the values from X alone, and the probability
mass function for the marginal distribution is denoted
as p(x). Since the fields found in network data contain
discrete values, we represent marginal distributions as
a histogram where each bin represents the probability
mass for a single value in the sample space of the distri-
bution. Likewise, a discrete joint distribution on random
variables X and Y would be described such that each
bin represents the probability mass for the pair of values
x and y taken from their respective sample spaces, and
so on for increasing numbers of random variables.
In some cases, the values in the network data may
change slightly, although their underlying meanings are
equivalent. For instance, if two TCP connections send
the exact same data, then their histograms of packet sizes
should be exactly the same (i.e., their bin values and am-
plitudes should be the same). However, various changes
could occur, such as TCP retransmissions, which skew
the histograms. One way of overcoming this problem
is to implement a smoothing technique on the distribu-
tion [5]. In practice, any number of smoothing strate-
gies may be applicable, but for our analysis we imple-
ment a very simple smoothing strategy that proceeds as
follows. For a random variable Z representing the dis-
tribution to be smoothed, we find the standard deviation
of Z and initially create one bin for each value such that
the bin represents the range of that value plus/minus the
standard deviation. Those bins with overlapping ranges
are merged into a single bin such that the smoothed his-
togram generated contains bins representing the proba-
bility mass for each permissible range of values.
Information Entropy and Mutual Information
The concept of information entropy [9] is central to
our analysis in that it provides a single value that quanti-
fies the amount of uncertainty in a random variable, and
acts as an intuitive indicator of anonymity [25, 11]. The
entropy of a random variable X represents the amount of





p(x) log p(x) (1)
The entropy of X takes its minimum value, zero, when
all probability mass is centered on a single value, and it
takes its maximum value, log N where N is the size of
the sample space, when all values are equiprobable.
Likewise, the mutual information [9] between two
random variables, X and Y , represents the amount of
information gained about one variable by learning the
outcome of the other, and is calculated as:









The mutual information between two random variables
is symmetric, and takes its minimum value of zero when
the two variables are statistically independent. Natu-
rally, since mutual information indicates the information
shared by the two variables, it is limited by the mini-
mum of their information entropies. To transform mu-
tual information into a more intuitive notion of corre-
lation, we can normalize it by its maximum value, as
shown in Equation 3. The normalized mutual informa-
tion takes values near one when the two variables are
heavily correlated, and values near zero when they are
independent. This normalized version makes it far more
intuitive to set a defining threshold between correlation
and independence.





In order to appropriately quantify the anonymity of
the network data, we require a similarity metric to com-
pare distributions to one another. Since we focus our
analysis on discrete distributions represented by his-
tograms, an intuitive choice for this similarity metric is
the L1 similarity. The L1 similarity represents the dif-
ference between the maximum L1 distance minus the
sum of the absolute differences between each of the cor-
responding bins in the two distributions, X and Y , as
shown in Equation 4. In general, the bins in X and
Y correspond to one another if they represent the same
value.
sim(X, Y ) = 2−
∑
z∈X∪Y
|P (X = z)− P (Y = z)| (4)
The L1 similarity takes its maximum value, two, when
both distributions are identical, and its minimum value,
zero, when the sample spaces of the distributions are
completely disjoint.
In our analysis, the L1 similarity calculation is com-
plicated by the fact that the anonymization process may
have permuted or otherwise changed the values in the
anonymized data (e.g., shuffling port numbers). In
this case, the values that the bins represent will no
longer map directly between the unanonymized and
anonymized distributions. We will reexamine this issue
in Sections 3 and 6.1, and show how to use a mapping re-
lation to correctly simulate the adversary’s information
about the correct mappings in this L1 similarity calcula-
tion.
3 Adversarial Model
The underlying principle of our analysis is a re-
alistic simulation of an adversary whose goal is to
deanonymize the network data. For clarity, we explic-
itly define the goal of our simulated adversary, state our
assumptions on the adversary’s power, and describe how
those assumptions relate to real-life adversaries.
The Adversary’s Goal
In our analysis, an object is characterized by a set
of distributions on the features of the network data
(i.e., fields or groups of fields), which represent its
presence in the data. Thus, an (un)anonymized object
is an object with its distributions calculated from the
(un)anonymized version of the network data. Given an
anonymized object and a set of unanonymized objects,
the adversary’s goal is to create a mapping between the
anonymized object and its unanonymized counterpart by
comparing the feature distributions of the anonymized
object to all unanonymized objects.
This definition of the adversary’s goal maps closely
to that of a real-life adversary mounting an inference at-
tack. In both cases, the adversary compares feature dis-
tributions to infer the identity of an anonymized object.
The primary difference between the two is that the real
adversary must approximate the set of unanonymized
objects and their distributions, while our simulated ad-
versary has exact information about the objects and their
distributions, drawn directly from the unanonymized
network data. In doing so, we perform a worst-case
analysis of the indistinguishability of the objects.
Auxiliary Information
Beyond the feature distributions themselves, the ad-
versary also has access to auxiliary information, which
she can use to refine the accuracy of her inferences.
One of the primary problems for the adversary in
deanonymizing the data lies in accurately comparing the
anonymized distributions to the unanonymized distribu-
tions. The anonymization process is intended to make it
difficult for the adversary to directly compare the distri-
butions, and so a relation must be applied which maps
the anonymized values to their potential unanonymized
counterparts. The auxiliary information is used to refine
this mapping relation.
One piece of auxiliary information available to a real-
life adversary is expert knowledge of the network data
semantics. From knowledge of the semantics, the adver-
sary can examine the relationships among the fields in
the network data to select features that best describe the
Object Type Definition
Host Distinct Local IP
Web Page Distinct Local IP and(Interarrival time < n seconds and Remote Port = 80)
User Distinct Local IP and(User,Distinct IP,Time in Authentication Log)
Table 1: Example definitions used to group records into objects
objects. In our simulation, the fields in the network data
are annotated with their semantic type, and an automated
feature selection algorithm is used to extract the features
upon which we perform our analysis. The annotation
and feature selection process is discussed in Sections 4
and 5, respectively.
The real-life adversary also has access to meta-data,
which the data publisher provides to researchers to ex-
plain the context of the anonymized network data [21].
This meta-data might describe which packets had in-
correct checksums, the anonymized IP prefixes for the
network where the data was collected, or the types of
anonymization (if any) applied to each field in the data.
Information, such as the anonymized prefixes, can be
learned directly from the meta-data, which allows the
adversary to refine the mapping relation and increase the
accuracy of her inference attack. Also, other informa-
tion from the meta-data, such as the type of anonymiza-
tion used, helps in defining a set of algorithms that the
adversary can use to extract additional refinements to the
mappings after objects are deanonymized. The meta-
data information is added to our simulation as annota-
tions to the data, and we simulate the adversary’s use
of the learned information by implementing a mapping
relation, which is described in greater detail in Section
6.1.
4 Annotating the Data
For our purposes, network data consists of n records,
where each record is a tuple of m fields derived from
a single packet or network flow [6]. A packet record
might contain fields taken from the link, network, and
transport layer headers of a packet. Flow records, on the
other hand, contain fields which summarize information
about all packets that were transmitted during a single
session between two endpoints.
Network data can contain records generated due to
the presence of several types of objects. At a high level,
we might define a host object by the records sent or re-
ceived by a single host, a web page object might consist
of those records created due to the download of a spe-
cific web page, or a user object could be defined by all
of the records sent or received by a host while a specific
user was logged on to that system. To define an object
in our analysis, the data publisher describes constraints
on the fields within the network data (e.g., each IP ad-
dress from a given prefix is to be considered a host ob-
ject). Clearly, the definition of an object is limited only
by the data publisher’s knowledge of the object when
the data was collected. Some objects, like hosts, can be
defined with relatively little information by considering
each unique IP address from the data publisher’s admin-
istrative domain to be a host object. Conversely, defin-
ing objects like web pages or users may require extra
information, such as web proxy or authentication logs.
Example object definitions can be found in Table 1.
Once the objects are defined, the data publisher de-
scribes the characteristics and semantics of each field in
the data. This annotation of the data ensures that the
analysis treats each field appropriately with respect to
the values it contains. For our purposes, three annota-
tions on the data are required, which are also required
by current anonymization tools [20, 28]. First, the pub-
lisher provides the IP prefixes of the local networks that
appear in the data, along with their anonymized counter-
parts. This annotation ensures that our techniques only
analyze the anonymity of those objects within the pub-
lisher’s administrative domain, and allows us to refor-
mat the data in terms of local and remote, rather than
source and destination. Second, the publisher lists the
semantic types for each field, including a difference op-
erator for that semantic type and the type of smoothing
applied (if any). For instance, fields containing IP ad-
dresses would have the type IP, with a difference op-
erator of XOR and no smoothing. By assigning types
to the fields, we can automatically extract semantically
meaningful information about how these fields relate to
one another. Third, the data publisher lists the type of
anonymization applied to each field. The anonymization
type, such as prefix-preserving IP anonymization or de-
terministic mapping, dictates the algorithm to be used in
reversing the anonymization and augmenting the adver-
sary’s auxiliary information. Note that in many cases,
the semantic and anonymization types can be set to use
default settings for the given field, thereby limiting the
burden on the data publisher.
5 Feature Extraction and Selection
Many of the fields in the network data share complex
and semantically meaningful relationships which can
be considered as features. For instance, port scanning
behavior that might fingerprint a host is visible in the
Original Inter-record Intra-record
Local IP Remote IP Local IP Remote IP Original Local IP, Original Local IP, . . .
Original Remote IP Inter-record Local IP
192.168.0.10 192.168.0.250 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.240 192.168.0.10







Figure 1: Example data after creating inter- and intra- record fields with semantic type of IP and difference operator of XOR
way the destination port numbers change from record
to record. Also, combinations of fields may produce a
unique distribution where the constituent marginal dis-
tributions on those fields are not unique. Before apply-
ing our analysis techniques, it is important to examine
the semantically meaningful relationships among fields,
and extract the features that best represent those rela-
tionships.
5.1 Discovering Semantically Meaningful Relation-
ships
The semantic types of the fields are used to charac-
terize their relationships within the data, both within a
record (intra-record) and across two or more records
(inter-record). Initially, each of the n records in the net-
work data contains m fields annotated with their seman-
tic type. For each of the m initial fields, a new inter-
record field is added to each row that inherits the type of
the initial field. Likewise, we create a new intra-record
field for each pair of fields, both initial and inter-record,
with the same semantic type. The newly created intra-
record field inherits the semantic type of the fields used
to create it.
To populate the value for an intra-record field in
record k, we use the difference operator defined for its
semantic type and calculate the difference between its
two constituent fields in record k. For the value of an
inter-record field in record k, we compute the difference
between the value of its initial field at row k with the
same field’s value at row k−i (in our case, i = 1), where
the records are sequential and all belong to a single ob-
ject. For the inter-record field values at record k = 0, we
set the difference to be zero since there is no predecessor
record.
Figure 1, for instance, shows the resulting network
data after inserting the inter- and intra-record fields. The
data initially contains the Local and Remote IP fields.
Then two inter-record fields are created to calculate the
difference between values in the Local and Remote IP






intra-record fields are created for every pair
of initial and inter-record fields with the same type to
calculate the difference between values within the same
record.
We note that the network data may contain some
classes of subliminal channels that are not covered by
our discovery process, such as complex active prob-
ing attacks [1, 27]. Discovering all possible subliminal
channels in network data quickly becomes computation-
ally infeasible since it requires the examination of all
inter-record and intra-record relationships, whether they
are semantically meaningful or not. Instead, we focus
our analysis on a much narrower subset of these relation-
ships that represent typical areas of information leakage
that naturally occur within network data.
5.2 Feature Selection
When examined in isolation, the distribution of val-
ues in each of the fields may be similar among the ob-
jects being analyzed. However, when examined in ag-
gregate these fields may be unique and could be used
to distinguish the object. To see why, consider the case
where two hosts have a variety of local port and remote
IP address values in their respective records. Taken indi-
vidually, the distributions on the local port and remote IP
values for these hosts will be similar in an information
theoretic sense. However, if one host always communi-
cates with a single remote IP on a given port, while the
other host communicates with a variety of remote IPs on
that same port, then the two hosts will be distinguish-
able.
A naı̈ve solution to this problem is to analyze all pos-
sible joint distributions on these fields, but as with the
inter-record relationships, this will quickly lead to an
intractable number of distributions to examine for each
object. Instead, we select those joint distributions whose
constituent marginal distributions are heavily correlated
with one another, since the scenario described above can
only occur when the marginal distributions are corre-
lated to some degree. Moreover, if two fields are highly
correlated, then analyzing both fields for anonymity is
redundant, and thus we can reduce the computational
requirements of the analysis by examining the joint dis-
tribution instead.
The process of selecting a mutually independent set
of features proceeds as follows. For each pair of fields
(including the newly created inter- and intra-record
fields), we calculate the normalized mutual information
between their marginal distributions, as shown in Sec-
tion 2. If the normalized mutual information is above
Anonymization Type Deanonymized Values auxt+1 Relation
Anonymized Unanonymized
Deterministic Mapping port 150 port 80 150→ 80
CryptoPAn [14] 200.120.10.10 128.2.250.220 200.120.10.6→ 128.2.250.208/29
Pang et al. [20] 200.120.10.10 128.2.250.220 200.120.10.6→ 128.2.250.0/24
Table 2: Examples of reversing anonymization and updating auxt relation
some threshold (0.99 in our evaluation) we group the
two fields together. We further combine groups of fields
if they share at least one field in common. Finally, we
create a singleton group for each field which has not
been added to any other group. When the feature se-
lection process completes, we arrive at several groups
of fields where the fields within a group are transitively
correlated to one another, and fields in different groups
are mutually independent according to our threshold of
correlation. We take this set of mutually independent
groups of fields to be the features upon which we per-
form our analysis.
6 Analyzing Network Data Anonymity
The primary goal of our analysis is to quantify the
degree to which anonymized objects are distinguishable
within the provided network data. To perform this anal-
ysis, we compare the features of an anonymized object
to those of all unanonymized objects using the L1 sim-
ilarity (see Section 2), and use this comparison to de-
rive a probability distribution on the potential true iden-
tities of the object. Finally, we use the resultant prob-
ability distribution to calculate an entropy measure that
quantifies the distinguishability of the anonymized ob-
ject. However, it is important that the simulation of the
adversary’s behavior accurately reflect the auxiliary in-
formation available to the adversary at each step in the
analysis.
6.1 Modeling Auxiliary Information
The auxiliary information available to the adversary
can be modeled as a relation auxt : A → P(U), where
t is the current time step in our simulation of the ad-
versary, A is the set of anonymized values, and P(U)
is the power set of unanonymized values. Thus, for
some anonymized input, auxt outputs a set of one or
more potential unanonymized values given the informa-
tion available to the adversary at time t. At the start
of the analysis (t = 0), the adversary only has infor-
mation gained from annotations on the data. Thus, for
fields with no anonymization applied to them, auxt=0
will output the same value that was used as input, since
both the anonymized and unanonymized values are the
same. For fields with deterministic mappings, the rela-
tion would return all unanonymized values for that field
since the adversary does not know which is the correct
mapping for the anonymized input. For example, in the
case of prefix-preserving IP anonymization, the relation
would output a set of unanonymized IPs that is consis-
tent with the adversary’s knowledge of the local enter-
prise IP prefix.
As the analysis progresses, we simulate the knowl-
edge gained by the adversary after deanonymizing ob-
jects in the data. Upon deanonymizing an object, the ad-
versary can reverse the anonymization by running an al-
gorithm that compares anonymized and unanonymized
values for the deanonymized object. A new rela-
tion auxt+1 is generated from the previous relation
at time t and the newly learned information from the
latest deanonymization. For instance, if a field were
anonymized using deterministic mapping, the adver-
sary learns the mapping between pairs of anonymized
and unanonymized values, and the new relation is cre-
ated such that those pairs have a one-to-one mapping.
For prefix-preserving IP anonymization, the adversary
checks the length of the prefix match between the
anonymized IPs of the deanonymized object and all re-
maining anonymized IPs. The new relation then re-
quires that those remaining anonymized IPs match their
unanonymized counterparts up to the length of the calcu-
lated longest prefix match. Concrete examples of learn-
ing information from deanonymization are given in Ta-
ble 2.
The auxiliary information relation is used to
constrain our comparison between anonymized and
unanonymized values in two ways. First, as mentioned
in Section 2, L1 similarity requires the existence of a
mapping between the bins of the distributions being
compared. For comparison between anonymized and
unanonymized values, the mapping between bins must
respect the information available to the adversary in the
relation auxt. From among all of the possible mappings
allowed by auxt, we choose the mapping that provides
the highest L1 similarity. Second, objects are defined
by various constraints on the fields in the network data
(e.g., local IPs defining host objects). In order to provide
a correct analysis of the anonymity of an object, each
anonymized object should only be compared to those
unanonymized objects for which a mapping is possible
given the relation auxt.
6.2 Object Anonymity
Our analysis begins by examining the anonymity
of each anonymized object in isolation, called object
anonymity, where we consider only the information
found in the data annotation. To perform this analy-
sis, we begin with the relation auxt=0 and the ` fea-
ture distributions Fi=1...` identified using the technique
from Section 5.2. For each feature distribution Fi, we
calculate the L1 similarity between distribution Fi,A
for anonymized object A and distribution Fi,Uj for all
unanonymized objects Uj . We use the similarity val-
ues as a count to approximate a probability distribution,
represented as the random variable Xi,A, on the true
unanonymized identity of A with respect to feature Fi
as:





Notice that this probability distribution considers only
those objects present within the data, which follows
from our assumption that the adversary knows the set of
objects in the data and their exact unanonymized distri-
butions. From this probability distribution on the iden-
tity of A, we can calculate the entropy of A with respect
to feature Fi using Equation 1. In practice, there are
many cases where a single unique distribution may lead
to deanonymization. The entropy measures calculated
for each of the feature distributions can be used to ex-
amine cases of specific attacks on those distributions,
and whether the anonymization policy applied to those
distributions was effective in providing anonymity.
We also calculate the overall entropy of an object
from the entropy of the true identity probability distri-
bution for each of its constituent feature distributions.
Recall that the set of features produced from the fea-
ture selection process are mutually independent accord-
ing to the threshold on the normalized mutual informa-
tion. Therefore, given the entropy for each of the iden-
tity distributions for features Fi=1...`, we calculate the





Since we are summing the entropy value of each fea-
ture, the overall entropy value for a single object can be
as high as ` log N , where ` is the number of features
and N is the number of objects. The overall entropy of
the object assumes that learning the identity of an object
requires the adversary to learn the true identity for all
feature distributions of that object. Though this may not
be the case in many attack scenarios, we believe that the
overall entropy values are still beneficial in understand-
ing the general risk of deanonymization, and perform-
ing comparisons among different anonymization tech-
niques.
6.3 Conditional Object Anonymity
Though the object anonymity provides useful in-
formation about the anonymity of the data, it does
not capture the resilience of an anonymized dataset to
deanonymization. For instance, it may be possible that
the anonymity of objects within the data appears rea-
sonable, but upon deanonymizing a single object the ad-
versary learns enough information to undermine the re-
mainder of the data. Therefore, it is imperative that data
publishers have a method of detecting and quantifying
the effects of deanonymization so that comparisons can
be made among various anonymization techniques. In
order to achieve this, we need to consider the anonymity
of hosts conditioned upon the deanonymization of other
objects, which we call conditional object anonymity.
To perform our conditional anonymity analysis, we
first begin with the object anonymity analysis described
above using the relation auxt=0. We then choose the
object with the lowest entropy value, and assume that it
has been deanonymized by the adversary. In doing so,
we create a new relation auxt+1 from the information
learned from the deanonymization, and again perform
the same analysis as the object anonymity case using
auxt+1 to constrain the mapping of anonymized values.
We continue this process iteratively, choosing the lowest
entropy object at each step in the process, learning its in-
formation, and augmenting the mapping relation. The
process completes when all anonymized objects have
been deanonymized. The sequence of deanonymizations
provides the data publisher with a notion of the adver-
sary’s strategy for deanonymizing the data, and allows
different anonymization techniques to be compared to
better understand their performance after deanonymiza-
tion occurs.
7 Evaluation
To underscore the utility of our analysis techniques,
we examine several concrete uses of those techniques in
quantifying the anonymity of network data. We apply
our techniques to a network trace recorded over a period
of 24 hours at the edge of the Johns Hopkins University
Information Security Institute (JHUISI) network. That
network contains three subnets with a total of 237 hosts
present in the data. For our analysis, we treat each of the
27,753 flows in the data as a single record with 19 fea-
tures derived (as described in Section 5) from the orig-
inal fields: start time, end time, local IP,
local port, local size, remote IP, remote
port, remote size, and protocol. In our data,
the remote size and local size fields are the
sum of the packet sizes sent to the remote and local hosts
in the given flow, respectively. Our subsequent analysis
focuses on the anonymity of host objects in the network
data, where each distinct local IP address is treated as a
different host object. In what follows, we show how a
data publisher can (i) examine which objects may risk
deanonymization due to unique distributions, (ii) ob-
jectively compare the anonymity provided by different
















JHUISI - Total Entropy
JHUISI - Maximum Entropy
Figure 2: CDF of the total entropy of host objects, assum-
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JHUISI - Local and Remote Port
Figure 3: CDF of the three worst features
of selective deanonymizations on the anonymity of other
objects in the data.
7.1 Quantifying overall anonymity
One of the most obvious applications of our analysis
is in quantifying the anonymity of the objects in a partic-
ular dataset. Figure 2 shows the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of the total entropy for the host objects
in the dataset, as calculated by Equation 6. A CDF, such
as the one provided here, allows the data publisher to
quickly and intuitively quantify the overall anonymity of
the objects in the dataset. The graph shows, for example,
that a substantial fraction of hosts in the data have rela-
tively low entropy compared to the maximal entropy—
assuming, of course, that all features are independent of
one another. An equally useful view is the CDF of the
lowest entropy features across all hosts in the dataset,
as shown in Figure 3. This view provides the data pub-
lisher with a method for verifying the soundness of the
chosen anonymization policy for each feature. For in-
stance, Figure 3 shows that the remote and local port
feature provides distinguishing information for many of
the hosts in the data, and as such, it may be prudent to
re-examine the anonymization policy for these features.
7.2 Comparative analysis
Another important contribution of this type of anal-
ysis is that it allows for an objective comparison of
anonymization techniques and the impact that selective
deanonymizations have on their soundness. As an exam-
ple, we compare the prefix-preserving IP anonymization
system of Pang et al. [20] to the CryptoPAn system [14],
as applied to the JHUISI dataset. For context, recall
that the CryptoPAn system is strictly prefix-preserving,
meaning that if two unanonymized IP addresses share
a k-bit prefix, then so will their anonymized counter-
parts. The anonymization system of Pang et al., how-
ever, uses a pseudo-random permutation to anonymize
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JHUISI - CryptoPAn
Figure 4: Comparison of Pang et al. anonymization to Cryp-
toPAn
fore, the approach of Pang et al. only guarantees that two
IPs in the same unanonymized subnet will also be in the
same anonymized subnet, but all other prefix relation-
ships among the IPs are broken. In this comparison, we
examine the average entropy across all hosts at each step
in the conditional anonymity analysis, as shown in Fig-
ure 4. The graph illustrates several interesting properties
of these two anonymization techniques, which allow a
data publisher to make informed decisions on their use.
Most notably, the graph shows that the approach of Pang
et al. provides greater privacy than the CryptoPAn ap-
proach, especially after a few deanonymizations (three,
in this case) have occurred.
Additionally, Figure 4 shows an interesting pattern of
increasing average entropy followed by an abrupt drop,
which occurs repeatedly for CryptoPAn, and less often
for the approach of Pang et al. To see why this pattern
emerges, it is instructive to recall how we model the
process of deanonymization. In particular, recall that
at each iteration of the conditional anonymity analysis
we choose the anonymized host with the lowest entropy







Table 3: Entropy and references in a popular search engine for
hosts in the example dataset
and deanonymize it, thus revealing its true identity. This
deanonymization can result in two possible outcomes for
the adversary’s auxiliary information. In the case where
the deanonymization results in learning prefix informa-
tion about a substantial number of hosts, the average en-
tropy will drop significantly due to the change in entropy
for each of the affected hosts (e.g., iteration 40 for Pang
et al. and 120 for CryptoPAn). When the deanonymiza-
tion provides no information or information on very few
hosts, the result is an increase in the average entropy
(e.g., iterations 4–39 for Pang et al. and 81–119 for
CryptoPAn). This somewhat unintuitive increase oc-
curs in part due to the removal of very unique hosts that
skew the average entropy downward and the fact that
we gain little or no additional information about the re-
maining hosts. Once all unique hosts are exhausted and
the adversary learns all available information about the
anonymized subnets, the average entropy decreases in a
smooth logarithmic curve, as seen in the Pang et al. plot.
By contrast, the average entropy under CryptoPAn con-
tinues the pattern of increased entropy followed by dras-
tic drops because additional information about the prefix
is continually learned throughout the deanonymization
process.
7.3 On the impact of selective deanonymizations
Given the continued threat to data privacy, one in-
triguing benefit of our analysis is that it allows data pub-
lishers to explore the effect of selective deanonymiza-
tions. As a concrete example, we apply our analysis
techniques to the JHUISI dataset in the context of a
recently discovered behavioral profiling attack [8]. In
that attack, the adversary uses public information to es-
timate the services provided by hosts (as indicated by
port numbers) within the network where the anonymized
data was captured. By comparing the estimated services
with those indicated in the anonymized data, the adver-
sary can reveal the host’s identity.
To evaluate the impact of this attack on the data, we
examine the entropy for the local and remote port feature
for each host in the anonymized data with publicly avail-
able information. For our purposes, we simply use the
number of references found in a popular search engine
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Figure 5: CDF of the the total entropy with and without
deanonymized servers in the auxiliary information
its available public information. Table 3 shows each of
the hosts with at least one reference, along with their en-
tropy values for the local and remote port feature. No-
tice that there is a substantial gap between the first three
hosts and all others in Table 3 in terms of their public
references and entropy values. The results indicate that
simnet, spar, and skdnssec are at risk of deanonymiza-
tion from the behavioral profiling attack, and, in fact,
these were the same three hosts that were deanonymized
in previous work [8].
Armed with insights regarding the hosts likely to suc-
cumb to the behavioral profiling attack, we can exam-
ine the effect that these deanonymizations would have
on the rest of the data. We do so by assuming these
hosts have been deanonymized and are now in the ad-
versary’s auxillary information, then repeat the compu-
tation in Section 6.3. Specifically, for our JHUISI data
anonymized with the Pang et al. anonymization system,
we take the anonymized values associated simnet, spar,
and skdnssec, add their correct mappings to auxt as if
they have been deanonymized, and then recompute the
total anonymity of the dataset.
Figure 5 shows the CDF for the JHUISI dataset with-
out deanonymizations compared with the case where we
assume the three hosts have been deanonymized and
added to the adversary’s auxiliary information. The
graph shows a significant reduction in the anonymity
of the remaining hosts in the dataset, with over 50%
of hosts experiencing a reduction in entropy of approx-
imately 20 bits. Intuitively, the reason for this reduc-
tion is that the auxt relation has been augmented with
more accurate information about the anonymized pre-
fixes. Consequently, the remaining hosts are placed into
their correct subnets and the set of possible true identi-
ties is reduced substantially in some cases. This same
approach can be used by data publishers to anticipate
attacks, and examine various “what-if” scenarios in an
objective and quantifiable manner.
Discussion and Future Work
The techniques provided in this paper can be com-
putationally intensive, requiring significant time to fully
compute the object anonymity and conditional object
anonymity. Informally, our analysis is quadratic in the
number of objects being analyzed, and when applied to
the JHUISI dataset the analysis completed in approxi-
mately 8 hours on a single 2.4GHz processor.
One avenue of future work lies in the creation of
methods for reducing the computational expense of our
analysis while maintaining its correctness. We do note,
however, that network data collection and anonymiza-
tion is generally an offline process performed over the
course of several weeks or months, and once published,
the data may remain available to the public for several
years. Consequently, the time spent evaluating the pri-
vacy implications of the anonymized network data is
short relative to the other steps in the process, and this
evaluation pays substantial dividends to the data pub-
lisher in the form of increased confidence in the saniti-
zation of the data. Other important areas of future work
include methods for efficiently examining a wider range
of relationships within the data, and the application of
our analysis technique to other object types, such as web
pages.
8 Related Work
Notions of anonymity similar in spirit to those devel-
oped in this paper have also been used in the database
privacy literature. However, unlike in the network data
setting, database attributes are typically explicitly la-
beled as either sensitive or non-sensitive. The most
widely known definition of privacy in that setting is
k-Anonymity [24], which requires that each record in
the database be indistinguishable from at least k − 1
other records, with respect to every set of potentially-
identifiable non-sensitive attributes. These k indistin-
guishable records are then referred to as forming an
equivalence class, or an anonymity set.
Machanavajjhala et al. [18] point out two possible at-
tacks on k-anonymous databases that can occur when
parts of the data are homogeneous with respect to the
sensitive attribute(s), or when the adversary has some
prior knowledge of the population statistics. To ad-
dress these shortcomings in k-Anonymity, they pro-
pose the notion of l-Diversity, which requires that each
equivalence class in the database have at least l “well-
represented” values for each sensitive attribute. Li
et al. [17] point out weaknesses in l-Diversity that occur
when dealing with numerical data or skewed categorical
data, and they in turn propose the notion of t-Closeness
as a more robust definition of privacy. They define an
equivalence class to have t-Closeness if the distance be-
tween the distribution of a sensitive attribute within the
class and the distribution of the sensitive attribute in the
whole database is below some threshold t.
Unfortunately, the unique nature of network data
makes it difficult to apply these notions directly to
packet traces or NetFlow logs. One of the main chal-
lenges when dealing with network data is that it can
be very difficult to know a priori which fields should
be considered sensitive and which of the non-sensitive
fields could be potentially identifying. Moreover, the
most sensitive pieces of information, such as hosts’ or
users’ behaviors, are often not well described by single
records.
Other work has focused on assessing the privacy
provided by various kinds of anonymization schemes.
Distantly related is the work of Diaz et al. [11] and
Serjantov and Danezis [25], which uses metrics based
on information entropy to measure the connection-level
anonymity provided to message senders in anonymizing
mix networks. Lebanon et al. [16] apply statistical deci-
sion theory to assess the risk to privacy associated with
the publication of anonymized databases. Similar to this
work, the approach of Lebanon et al. allows for the mod-
eling of the adversary’s auxiliary information, although
such information must be configured manually by the
data publisher.
Concurrently with our work, Ribeiro et al. [23] pro-
posed a new technique for undermining the privacy
of enterprise network traces anonymized with prefix-
preserving anonymization. Like the approach presented
in this paper, their work also suggests methods for
quickly analyzing network data for hosts that are vul-
nerable to their proposed attack.
9 Conclusion
Since the continued availability of anonymized net-
work data relies heavily on the successful application
of anonymization techniques—and the data publisher’s
confidence in the efficacy of those techniques—we be-
lieve that the analysis methods in this paper provide
several tangible benefits. Specifically, we present the
first methods, of which we are aware, for analyzing the
anonymity of network data. Using our analytical tech-
niques, we show how data publishers can make informed
decisions about the appropriate use of anonymization
tools and the publication of anonymized data, thereby
gaining confidence in the privacy of that data. We further
demonstrate the utility of our techniques by showing
their use in quantifying the anonymity of host objects,
objectively comparing datasets and anonymization tech-
niques, and examining the effects of deanonymization.
It is our hope that the methodology presented in this pa-
per, along with the continued evolution of anonymiza-
tion techniques and public data repositories, will further
encourage the sharing of anonymized network data.
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Transaction Specific Pseudonymization for IP Traffic
Monitoring. In Proceedings of the 4th International Con-
ference on Cryptology and Network Security, pages 261–
273, December 2005.
[20] R. Pang, M. Allman, V. Paxson, and J. Lee. The Devil
and Packet Trace Anonymization. ACM Computer Com-
munication Review, 36(1):29–38, January 2006.
[21] V. Paxson. Strategies for Sound Internet Measurement.
In Proceedings of the 4th ACM SIGCOMM Conference
on Internet Measurement, pages 263–271, 2004.
[22] PREDICT: Protected Repository for the Defense of In-
frastructure Against Cyber Threats. http://www.
predict.org.
[23] B. Ribeiro, W. Chen, G. Miklau, and D. Towsley. An-
alyzing Privacy in Enterprise Packet Trace Anonymiza-
tion. In Proceedings of the 15th Network and Distributed
Systems Security Symposium, to appear, 2008.
[24] P. Samarati and L. Sweeney. Protecting Privacy When
Disclosing Information: k-Anonymity and its Enforce-
ment Through Generalization and Suppression. Technical
Report SRI-CSL-98-04, SRI Computer Science Labora-
tory, 1998.
[25] A. Serjantov and G. Danezis. Towards an Information
Theoretic Metric for Anonymity. In Proceedings of Pri-
vacy Enhacing Technologies, pages 41–53, 2002.
[26] C. Shannon, D. Mooore, and K. Keys. The Internet
Measurement Data Catalog. ACM SIGCOMM Computer
Communications Review, 35(5):97–100, Oct. 2005. See
http://imdc.datcat.org/browse.
[27] Y. Shinoda, K. Ikai, and M. Itoh. Vulnerabilities of Pas-
sive Internet Threat Monitors. In Proceedings of the 14th
USENIX Security Symposium, pages 209–224, 2005.
[28] A. Slagell, K. Lakkaraju, and K. Luo. FLAIM: A Multi-
level Anonymization Framework for Computer and Net-
work Logs. In Proceedings of the 20th USENIX Large In-
stallation System Administration Conference, pages 63–
77, 2006.
[29] TCPdPriv. http://ita.ee.lbl.gov/html/
contrib/tcpdpriv.html.
[30] TCPurify. http://irg.cs.ohiou.edu/
˜eblanton/tcpurify/.
